Regional Cosmopolitanism: The EU in Search of its Legitimation

What could be the legitimation basis of the European Union (EU)? This article questions the idea of two constitution-making subjects in the EU and claim there is and can only be one constituting subject even in a multilevel configuration like the EU. The EU can thus not be seen as a federation of nation states. Rather it must be seen as a quasi-federation of states and citizens united under a common legal framework with a universalistic underpinning. The EU’s commitment to basic human principles means that it has a communal vocation that is broader and more universal than that of a multinational federation. Copyright The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.co

Banishing dominance in Europe: The case for regional cosmopolitanism

How is arbitrary rule – dominance – to be avoided when political differentiation is on the rise in the multilevel constellation that makes up the European Union? The EU is a power-wielding entity, that, due to its democratic deficits, is an instance of arbitrary rule, which differentiation only serves to exacerbate. This article discusses which political framework prevents dominance under conditions of asymmetric and complex interdependence, and economic integration in Europe. Under these conditions, the framework of international law is deficient, as the agreements with the associated non-members – the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and Switzerland – document. Here dominance appears to be self-incurred but nevertheless in breach with political freedom. Another is the framework suggested by Jürgen Habermas, of a pouvoir constituant mixte. Also, this framework raises the danger of arbitrary rule, as there is a risk that the autonomy of citizens would be pre-empted by the sovereignty of their states. The article holds the framework of a regional cosmopolitan federation – a rights-based polity with a distinct territorial reach – as more promising

DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY - Working agreement or rational consensus?

The quest for deliberative democracy is connected to the difficulties with what we for the sake of simplicity refer to as a voting model of democracy.1 This model holds elections and votes as the central features of democracy because they establish egalitarian structures of decision-making. Equal respect for citizens is secured by the aggregation of citizens’ preferences through neutral and fair institutions. It is through voting that the citizens’ will is expressed and it is through the organizational principle of parliamentary democracy - party competition and majority vote - that decisions can be made in a democratic way. I proceed by first spelling out the deliberative procedure and the reasons for deliberative democracy. Further, I approach the problem of democratic legitimacy and delineate two alternative readings of deliberative democracy – the ‘rationalistic’ and the ‘participatory’ one. Then I address Habermas’ epistemic account of the moral value of democratic procedures and the problem this poses for a viable conception of democratic legitimacy. I make the case for a weaker form of consensus as the criterion of democratic legitimacy - a working agreement resting upon different, but reasonable reasons

Getting to agreement: mechanisms of deliberative decision-making

Deliberation has not only epistemic and moral value, it also has transformative value. Even if deliberation faces the problem of indeterminacy, it is assumed to have explanatory power. This article spells out why this is so and suggests a way to establish the causing effect of deliberation. It outlines a reason-based (RB) model of political decision-making applicable also to international affairs. By specifying a theory of argumentation on collective decision-making, we get to the nuts and bolts of deliberative decision-making, which, when supported by institutional powers, ensures a justified and well-grounded decision. The model contains a set of rules of inference and offers ‘mechanismic’ accounts of social events. It allows for explanations, but not predictions. The RB model conceives of decision-making as consisting of three sequences: claims-making, justification, and learning, each containing a set of explanatory mechanisms: values referring to conceptions of the common good, mandatory norms concerning the right thing to do, and evidence to the fact that non-compliance is wrong. The explanatory potential of this scheme is exemplified with reference to agreement making in the European Union. Some actors changed opinion voluntarily with regard to empowering the European parliament

Political differentiation and the problem of dominance: Segmentation and hegemony

At first glance, one might view the political differentiation in the European Union as a reflection of the autonomy of its member states, signifying flexibility and the dispersion of democratic control. However, under conditions of complex interdependence and economic integration, political differentiation can undermine the fundamental conditions for democratic self-rule. Political differentiation may cause dominance. It is argued in this article that we must move beyond Philip Pettit's conception of dominance as the capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary basis, in order to properly identify the undemocratic consequences of differentiation. Political freedom is also a question of institutional provisions to co-determine laws. From this vantage point, differentiation raises the spectre of dominance in the form of decisional exclusion and the pre-emption of political autonomy. Drawing on a re-conceptualisation of dominance, the effects of differentiation on the possibility of self-rule are examined, and two systematic effects of political differentiation are identified. It is argued that segmentation is the systemic effect of differentiation in the vertical dimension of integration. Here, dominance occurs in the form of exclusion from decision-making bodies and the denial of choice opportunities. In the external horizontal dimension, the systemic effect of differentiation is hegemony. Some states are vulnerable to arbitrary interference and the pre-emption of public autonomy. The article discusses developments within the Eurozone as a case of segmentation and the statues of associated non-members as a case of hegemony. With regard to the latter, we are faced with the phenomenon of self-incurred dominance. The final version of this research has been published in European Journal of Political Research. © 2018 Wile

Three Conceptions of Global Political Justice

The concept of global justice implies that there are principles of justice with a global reach – that is, that the conditions of justice have been globalised in one way or another. Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice (GLOBUS) investigates the concept of justice that characterises the EU’s external activities: justice as non-domination, as impartiality, or as mutual recognition. In this paper, these ‘reasonable’ conceptions of justice, which may be seen to complement each other, are outlined and assessed. They all entail serious limitations with regard to the requirements of justice at the global level. Justice as non-domination demands the social status of being relatively proof against arbitrary interference by others. Here, justice involves avoiding harm and establishing a fair system of (network) governance within the constraints of international law. But under such a system, how can we ensure compliance and legal certainty? According to justice as impartiality, preventing dominance through strong institutions is necessary for the equal protection of human rights. Law-based orders are required to banish dominance, also in external relations. However, in this scheme, who would be the arbitrator? Justice as mutual recognition calls for deliberation to right wrongs, prioritizing the significance of belonging and respect for diversity in the resolution of matters of justice. Misrecognition or lack of recognition can also affect an individual’s political status and may amount to dominance. But how can we guarantee parity of recognition without enforceable rights, and how can we promise justice without sanctioning non-compliance